other organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood. Most of them were informally organised as "families" (usar) . Like the Muslim Brotherhood whose members were released from prison in this period, they were supported by the state as a counterbalance to the left. 10 In Asyut and Aswan they were even subsidised by the local governor. 11 The organisational backbone of the Jama'at was established by study "circles" (halaqat). One of the important activities they organised were summer camps, where students not only were taught fiqh (law) and tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) but also engaged in physical training and self-defence, as the Brotherhood had done in the 1940s and 1950s. The Jama'at gained adherents by not concentrating so much on politics as on providing services for students, such as free transport, copies of lectures, and organising markets for cheap food, books and clothing. 12 Through their networks and their ideology of purity the Jama'at had a potential to become a political opposition.
Especially in Upper Egypt, where next to Asyut University new universities had been built in Sohag, Qina, and Minya, the Jama'at grew into a contentious movement during the second half of the 1970s. One person stood out as particularly influential in the ideological development of the Jama'at: 'Abdallah al-Samawi. After having been imprisoned at the age of sixteen for his activities in the Brotherhood he had become alienated from the organisation at the end of the 1960s. Al-Samawi was able to create an independent network and devote himself completely to preaching and organising study circles. His Jama'a expanded between 1974 and 1978 to several thousand members who supported him with donations. 13 Another important figure is 'Umar 'Abd alRahman (b. 1938), who became the "spiritual father" of the Jama'a when it became a separate organisation.
14 Like 'Abdallah al-Samawi, he had been in conflict with the state since the 1960s. . Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara al-'Arabiyya li-l-I'lam wa-l-Nashr, 1991, p. 14. 15 For an interesting, though partly absurd, biography of 'Umar 'Abd al- Rahman, because Ideologically, the Jama'at were "immature" in the first half of the 1970s. 16 The movement had neither a clear policy nor a clearly defined project. 17 Most members were simply pious and endeavoured to follow a "traditional Salafism", 18 which had been founded in the 1920s. The movement was conservative, ritualistic, based on peaceful hisba and agitated especially against Sufism. In the 1970s it re-established its relations with Saudi Arabia and became oriented towards the Saudi Salafi establishment. 19 In contrast, most it is based on conspiracy theory that he was manipulated by the Americans, 'at al-islamiyya, p. 73 . This is the common theme of the present first generation of activists. See also Kamal al-Sa'id Habib, al-Haraka al-islamiyya, p. 31, who regards these years as "almost like a dream" that was filled with a spirituality, enthusiasm, and solidarity, but needed direction, organisation, and rules. In their interviews with the editor-in-chief of al-Musawwar, Makram Muhammad Ahmad, the Jama'a leadership also confirm their inexperience ("twenty years ago we were young men (shabab)"). 20 or 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, "we were our own shaykhs", Muntasar al-Zayyat (b. 1956), the later-to-become lawyer of the Jama'a, states in his memoirs. 21 For some students it was an opportunity to emerge as ideologues in their own right, such as 'Isam Darbala, one of the later student leaders of the Upper Egyptian movement, who was admired by his peers as a "theoretician" and "a man of culture" for his knowledge of Salafi theology and jurisprudence. 22 However, by the mid 1970s the Jama'at had adopted such potentially revolutionary concepts as jahiliyya (period of ignorance) and hakimiyya (sovereignty of God as opposed to the sovereignty of man) from Sayyid Qutb. 23 His Milestones was a key text in cadre training courses in 1980 and many members knew whole sections of it by heart.
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Sayyid Qutb, however, had little to say on hisba, and it is from Ibn Taymiyya that they derived the characteristic repertoire of contention of "changing the forbidden/reprehensible" (taghyir al-munkar). 25 He argued that in extreme cases it was the right of every subject to exert hisba and to use force without the sanction of the state. 26 By linking hisba with the concept of tawhid al-rububiyya, the necessity to completely submit to God's sovereignty, it was developed into an activist "programme of changing evil by force" (manhaj taghyir al-munkar bi-l-quwwa).
27 Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, at the time a student leader in Minya, stated that they had to "rid themselves of the despots (tawaghit, Habib remarks that traditional Salafis were only interested in morals (akhlaq) and purity (tazkiya) and did not show any interest in reality (waqi ') Despite their growing antagonism towards the state, the actions of the Jama'at were mainly directed against the community. The struggle against moral corruption (al-fasad al-akhlaqi) adopted the form of disrupting music performances, intervening in the showing of Western films, as well as preventing other forms of corruption: liquor stores, video shops and mixed gender trips of students. 29 Smashing Christian liquor stores in Aswan with clubs was one way of expressing their religious zeal, 30 preventing the building of cinemas was another method. 31 But it is clear that hisba represented a multi-faceted repertoire of contention that was also used to encroach upon the prerogatives of the authorities. The clash with the authorities led to a cycle of contention.
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Demonstrations, sit-ins, prayer sessions on the streets (when mosques they controlled were closed down), and intimidation, followed by negotiations with and concessions by the authorities, led to a further expansion of their horizon, higher demands, and a new phase of contention, ending in violence.
33
During this cycle the Jama'at increasingly became involved in public clashes with the state, such as the "food riots" of 18 and 19 January 1977 34 and the demonstrations against the Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel during the following year. By the end of the 1970s, the state regarded the Jama'at in Upper Egypt as a threat and student leaders were suspended from attending university.
35
A separate organisation
The turning point came in 1977 when the Jama'at were able to translate their numbers into power by electing their leaders to student unions. Some became both an amir of a local Jama'a and the chairman of a student union, 36 increasing their power and outreach. 37 In this period also the competition with the Muslim Brotherhood grew as the Brotherhood tried to recruit a new generation to its ranks. 38 The main difference between the Jama'at in Upper and those in Lower Egypt was the specific interpretation of hisba by the Upper Egyptian Jama'at and the acceptance of violence. 39 The Upper Egyptian Jama'at condemned the Brotherhood for its weak manhaj and its refusal to "change evil by force". 40 But the differences went deeper. They claimed that they differed in their creed ('aqida al-sunna wa-l-jama'a), condemning the Brotherhood for its rejection of the Qutbian concept of hakimiyya, which made it imperative to rise up in revolt against the ruler who does not rule in accordance with the revelation.
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For its part, the Brotherhood started to detach itself from the student societies of Upper Egypt after they had declared Sadat an unbeliever. 42 Their relations reached a breaking point when these Jama'at laid claim to the term Salafism, 43 regarding themselves as living "according to the Salafi understanding" (nahwa fahm salafi). 44 The organisational split occurred within the Jama'at in 1978 when many student leaders in Lower Egypt proclaimed their adherence to the 36 al-Zayyat, al-Jama'at al-islamiyya, p. 61. 37 Ibid., p. 66. 38 Brotherhood, to the outrage of their Upper Egyptian colleagues. 45 In March of that year a conference was organised in Asyut during which the Upper Egyptian Jama'a was established as a separate organisation with its own leader, Najih Ibrahim. 46 Characteristically it established vigilante groups "to change the wrong" (taghyir al-munkar) in the form of forbidding the drinking of alcohol and the mixing of sexes. It also started to print pamphlets in its own name. 47 Its activities expanded to include harassing Copts and the imposition of a head tax (jizya) on them. 48 Religious leaders such as 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, legalised (istihalla) the appropriation of the money of the Copts, and robberies took place in such places as Shubra al-Khayma in Lower Egypt and Nag' al-Hamadi in Upper Egypt, during which several Coptic goldsmiths were killed. 49 In addition to clashes with Copts during the national/pagan holiday of Shamm al-Nasim, it also attacked Sufis, and fights occurred during the celebration of saints' days, mawlids.
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Merger with Tanzim al-Jihad
The merger with the Jihad Organisation in 1979-1980 has been extensively analysed and needs no elaboration here except for a few points that illustrate the influence of Tanzim al-Jihad on the Jama'a. 51 First, the unification marked a merger of two different tactics of overthrowing the regime by means of a coup d'état by the Tanzim, 52 supported by a "popular revolution" (thawra sha'biyya) led by the Jama'a. 53 to draw up a strategy for achieving this goal. 54 Regarding revolution as a method that could lead to formation of a "special praxis", 55 the new organisation closely studied the Iranian revolution that erupted in 1979.
56 Third, as a result of this merger members of the Jama'a for the first time received military training in the mountains along the Nile Valley in Upper Egypt. 57 The plan was to take over power after a period of three years. 58 Notwithstanding the merger, the basic differences could not be overcome between the two parts of the organisation. The main issue was the role of hisba.
59 Whereas the Jihad Organisation was a secret conspiratorial organisation that concentrated on al-munkar al-akbar (the greatest evil, i.e., of the state) and believed that the state could only be brought down by a tight knit vanguard that was capable of penetrating the military and staging a coup d'état, the Jama'a focused on open activism. 60 Characteristically, the Jihad Organisation condemned hisba because it attracted the attention of the police. 61 Eventually these differences would crystallise into the two main strategies of the 1980s laid down in the Mithaq al-'amal al-islami (The Charter of Islamic Action) of the Jama'a and the Manhaj al-haraki li-Jama'at al-Jihad (The Activism Programme of the Jihad Group) of the Jihad Organisation.
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The second generation
The assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981 and the uprising in Asyut two days later, and the massive arrests which followed, did not mean a break with 54 Mubarak, al-Irhabiyyun, pp. 165-7. 55 See for the analysis of this concept in a contemporary form and the interaction of theory (nazariyya), programme, (manhaj) and application (tatbiq), Roel Meijer the past. The split that had existed before with the Muslim Brotherhood became even greater when it started to focus on civil society and gained seats in parliament in 1984 and 1987, while the Jihad Organisation and the Jama'a continued their strategies. Of the two, the Jama'a was by far the most successful. Ninety per cent of the actions and publications against the state in the 1980s and 1990s were from the Jama'a.
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Three developments were crucial in this period. First, the first generation of leaders (born in the second half of the 1950s) would remain in prison (until 2003-2006) , but would acquire prestige as the "historical leadership" (al-qada al-tarikhiyyun) and try to exert influence on events outside the prison through their extensive writings and communiqués. Second, a new leadership arose out of the second generation of students, who had been trained in the prisons and instructed on how to build a new infrastructure, 64 enabling them to take over daily operations of the Jama'a once they were released. The torture they had undergone in prison had radicalised them. 65 Third, the Jama'a diversified geographically, extending its influence, importantly, to the marginal suburbs in Cairo. 66 Fourth, a significant change took place in ideological writings. These became not only much more extensive, rigorous and systematic than the previous period, promoting violence via hisba and jihad, they also became much more political, promoting the establishment of an Islamic state, and therefore becoming more Islamist. In contrast to the rather abstruse The Hidden Duty of 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideologue of the Jihad Organisation, these writings were very direct. 67 Fifth, the Jama'a became a much more disciplined organisation after its members were released in 1984. Divided into different sections based on ideology and the paramilitary training of cadres, it was transformed into "an army" geared to the execution of hisba, the main element they retained from Salafism. When the second generation leaders were released from prison in 1984, they took up the familiar practice of "changing wrong" by breaking up mixed parties, music festivals, theatre performances. As before, they were able to take advantage of the weakness of the central authority and terrorise the universities, especially Asyut University, where they used knives and chains to intimidate students and professors. To a much greater degree than in the 1970s they were able to expand "Islamic space" to neighbourhoods in cities and villages in Upper Egypt. Their main venue was the mosque, especially the smaller mosques. They acquired popularity by providing social, educational and health services, distributing free health care, medicine and food, besides acting as intermediaries and power-brokers in neighbourhood conflicts, establishing a kind of militia for this purpose.
69 By the end of the 1980s, the Jama'a succeeded in gaining control over entire regions, such as the district of Dayrut, where it dominated fifty-two villages. 70 Its hegemony was not total, however. By the mid-1980s a group of independent Jama'at emerged that rejected violence. 71 After the appointment of Zaki Badr as Minister of Interior in 1987, the relations with the state deteriorated, and the police started forbidding lectures, preaching in mosques, 72 and opening fire on demonstrating students. 73 The major assassination attacks on officials in this period were not the work of the Jama'a but of other groups, such as the Najun min al-Nar (Saved from the Fire) and the followers of a shaykh in Fayyum, called the Shawqiyyun. 74 The life of an activist in the 1980s
An interesting insight into the activism of the Jama'a in the 1980s on the individual level can be gleaned from the autobiography of Khalid al-Birri. Born in 1972 in Asyut he became member of the Jama'a in 1986 at the age of fourteen while he was in secondary school. His autobiography confirms many of the notions on the process of radicalisation, of empowerment and alienation that are part of the "spiral of encapsulation". 76 In the neighbourhood where Khalid al-Birri lived, he was impressed by the combination of courage, even brutality, and the piety that the members of the Jama'a demonstrated. It was their capacity for "action", "bravery", sense of "honour" and "solidarity", mixed with their commitment to their religion (iltizam bi-dinihim) that made them attractive as role models for a young man in search of an identity. 77 Everything in his memoirs revolves around the practice of hisba as an internal, individual as well as an external, collective, disciplining principle. He recounts how he loved listening to music and was a great fan of football but erased the music from his cassettes, recorded Qur'an citations instead, and stopped watching TV under influence of a Salafi shaykh. 78 He also started to practice another important principle in Salafism, al-wala' wa-l-bara', avoiding contact with "all those who do not believe in God", especially his Coptic neighbours and friends. 79 During the next phase of empowerment-and alienation from his environment-he started practising hisba himself in his neighbourhood and at school. As he became aware of the "injustice of the unbeliever", embodied by the state, his "political consciousness" was raised. 80 The main reason for his transformation eventually, however, was an intellectual one. In the summer of 1987 he read The Inevitable Confrontation, 81 one of the more virulent tracts of the Jama'a that was peddled on the streets. For him it was a revelation, and he was immediately convinced of the necessity of armed resistance against the state. His ardour for martyrdom and self-sacrifice was reinforced by documentaries on the jihad in Afghanistan and songs, anashid, and gradually his personality was subsumed into that of the collective of the Jama'a. He equated "submission" and "total obedience" to God with obedience to the Jama'a and the excommunication (takfir) of "those who do not rule in accordance to what God has revealed". 82 Typically, for his and the previous generation, he acquired an understanding of the nature of activism and the "relationship between theory (nazariyya) and application (tatbiq)" by reading Sayyid Qutb, who provided him with a "complete cognitive model". 83 The sense that they were "distinguished" and "different" from the rest of society was translated in the minute details of eating and clothing and behaviour, and found its expression in the belief that they formed the vanguard of society. All attempts by the school to undermine the influence of these ideas, finally leading to his expulsion from school, only confirmed the just nature of the struggle against an "unbelieving system" (nizam kafir).
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Al-Birri also makes clear in his autobiography that the Jama'a leadership were shrewd and constantly adapted their repertoire of contention according to circumstances. At a certain point, for instance, it was convinced that the strategy of hisba as an activist method was too aggressive for secondary schools, and that it could only be practised in the more open and less controlled environment of the university or the neighbourhoods of towns. Toned down, propaganda was limited to "personal da'wa", the approach of individual pupils instead of formally organised meetings and indoctrination sessions in "study circles".
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The Salafi-Islamist revolution It might be an overstatement to present Khalid al-Birri as a typical Jama'a member, but his activist experience, and especially the pamphlets he read, confirm the ideological developments of the Jama'a in the 1980s. 86 These writ- ings are imbued with a Manichean world view, with the world divided into the bad and the good. Basically the Jama'a subscribed to a deductive method in its effort to combat the bad. Its reasoning is from principles to practice, from creed ('aqida) to method (manhaj), to application (tatbiq). 87 Their writings are geared to action and the Qur'an is regarded as a programme for "an activist method (manhajan harakiyyan) that taught us how to establish an Islamic state."
88 Also noteworthy in this worldview is that politics and religion are totally congruent. The worst political crime is not to err but to commit a sin (ma'siya), and sinfulness (fisq) is associated with misrule. 89 Politicians and westernised intellectuals are depicted not as having different political or cultural ideas but rather as being "mentally confused". 90 And acting politically correctly can only be achieved by one's commitment to religion (iltizam bi-dinihim).
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The writings of the Jama'a stress the comprehensive nature of religion. Inverting the official totalitarian discourse of the times, Islam is depicted as an all-encompassing, total system (shumuliyya) that regulates all aspects of life.
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The Charter states "our religion is complete, total and final". 93 In that sense the Jama'a, like all the rest of the Islamist movements, stresses the central paradox of Islamist political thought in modernity: the liberation of man by his total submission to God. Revolt against God is the same as sin (ma'siya), and as man by nature is the slave/servant ('abd) of God the goal of the Jama'a is "the subjection of man to God" (ta'bid al-nas li-rabbihim) 94 in accordance with Ibn Taymiyya's dictum that "Islam means obedience" (wa-l-din huwa al-ta 'a The political goal is the re-establishment of the caliphate. 96 However, the contradictions of applying the classical political doctrine of the Jama'a in a contentious age become apparent in the way an apolitical Salafism associated with pietism can snap and tip over into an activist, even revolutionary, movement at the crucial point when subservience is transformed into revolt. Although stressing the necessity of obedience ("obedience to the caliph is obedience to God") and compliance ("all his commands must be completely executed"), even when the ruler is oppressive (zalim) or sinful (fasiq), the Jama'a does allow for the ruler to be "uprooted" when the "heinous act" (mafsada) of deposing him is less grave than the "heinous act" of letting him remain in power. This leaves enough room for individual interpretation and forms the basis for a theory of revolt.
97
Once this step has been taken, the Jama'a leaves no doubt about the right to depose the ruler. The popular version of the Charter, entitled Who Are We and What Do We Want?, states: "No doubt that he who prefers man-made positive laws to the laws of God is a kafir […], " adding that "as it is not allowed for a kafir to rule over Muslims (la wilaya li-kafir 'ala muslim) it is a duty to depose the rulers of our country." 98 It is stressed that this can only be done by violent means and the assassination of Sadat is regarded as having been a rightful act (sahih). 99 Even in the 1990s, in a debate with Nasir al-Din al-Albani who condemns all political action, the right of revolt is justified if the ruler is an unbeliever (kafir).
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No less important is the repertoire of contention that the Jama'a propagates. The Charter does not single out any means, but holds a flexible view of activist praxis, depending on the circumstances. It states that the manner in which the movement "interacts with reality around us" (ta'amul ma'a al-waqi' hawlana) and finds "means of changing it", depends on the means that are presented by God.
101 But as politics is condemned as part of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic period), and hizbiyya (participating in politics) is rejected, 102 left. The first is da'wa, which is regarded as essential in every period in order to prevent people from deviating towards jahiliyya. 103 The second method, the most characteristic of the Jama'a, is hisba. 104 Typically almost no attention is spent on what should be changed, for on this issue "there is general agreement". Instead, all attention is focused on the issue of the qualifications of the persons who can exert this task, the muhtasib. Although hisba is a fard kifaya (collective obligation), it is, in the view of the Jama'a, also more demanding than da'wa. Hisba is limited to those who are legally responsible (mukallaf) and capable (qadir) to implement it, and in this context this involves the cadre of the movement. This is confirmed in classical legal doctrine, according to the Charter. The classical scholar al-Nawawi, for instance, explicitly argues that hisba is not restricted to Islamic authority (al-sulta al-muslima) but that everyone has the right (sahib al-haqq) to exert hisba. 105 The argument to usurp the right to exert hisba by force, by the hand (bi-l-yad), and the tongue (bi-llisan) from the state, is the tipping point where a conservative political doctrine is turned into an activist one: because the present authorities do not rule in accordance with the shari'a and as such they have lost their legitimacy to exert this right themselves, or to give this right or to withhold it. 106 Hisba thus becomes "one of the most important obligations of the Islamic movement, " and an instrument to "change reality" (taghyir al-waqi ') . In the present circumstances in which jahiliyya "is all around us", the Charter states that "we can only oppose it by hisba". 107 It is a means of bringing society "as close as possible to an Islamic society, and to realise one of our goals […]: to make man submit to his master (ta'bid al-nas li-rabbihim) and later to establish a caliphate". 108 Or as it is stated in the Charter: "There is no contradiction between hisba and striving to establish a Muslim state; on the contrary hisba is for us a way of re-establishing the caliphate". 109 Hisba can be applied whether there is a ruling entity among the Muslims or not. In fact, it is the raison d'etre of the Jama'a for "as long as this principle is applied the ummah will exist […] ." 110 The importance of hisba is also stressed in later works.
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The third method is that of jihad. Jihad is regarded as a permanent duty until Judgement Day. "We know that jihad is a historical inevitability" (hatmiyya tarikhiyya). The struggle between the believers and the unbelievers is eternal and the unbelievers will never rest until they have undermined Islam. 112 History is seen as a zero-sum game.
113 Jihad against the ruler is mentioned, but the Charter only states that removing the unbelieving ruler (al-hakim al-kafir) is a duty based on consensus, ijma ' . 119 It was regarded as shirk (polytheism) to take part in the political system. This, and the stress on other Salafi principles such as tawhid, wala' wa-l-bara' and hisba demonstrate the Salafi strain in the Jama'a's ideology. At the same time, some pamphlets make clear that the Jama'a had political goals. It opposed the rise in land rents, political corruption, the extension of the state of emergency and infringement of human rights. In the second half of the 1980s the Jama'a increasingly came into conflict with the state. Its interpretation of hisba, especially the expansion of physical and moral space and the encroachment on the territory of the state, which the government regarded as illegitimate, enhanced the likelihood of this confrontation. 121 When the Jama'a attacked tourists, starting in 1992, the state clamped down on the movement, dismantling the Jama'a's infrastructure in Upper and Lower Egypt. 122 In the end, 1,500 people died in clashes and 20,000 members, supporters, or simply family members of the Jama'a's followers were imprisoned. 123 Although the confrontation did not end until 1997, by 1995 it was apparent that the Jama'a was losing the low-intensity war. At the same time authority within the movement was shifting from the external leadership, who had migrated to Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s, 124 to the internal leadership. Two attempts were made to merge the two organisations, one in Afghanistan and the other in the Sudan, but in the end they failed for the same reasons as before. 125 Moreover, by that time there was another issue that came to the fore. While the Jihad Organisation decided that due to the military defeat in Egypt it should turn against the "far enemy", the Jama'a always believed that the "near enemy" was more important: "It is more important to fight the groups of denial (al-tawa'if al-mumtani'ah) in our country than to fight the Jews and the Communists in their lands." […] "We can only fight the far enemy after we have purified ourselves of the near enemy." 126 This is also apparent in the Jama'a's denial of any relationship with the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, when its "spiritual leader", 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, was arrested. 127 Nor did it react against the US when they arrested Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim in 1995 and transported him to Cairo. Instead, the Jama'a's historical leadership drew the conclusion that the confrontation with the state, always ambiguously stated, was counter-productive. In April 1996 the first preliminary attempt to stop violence (mubadarat waqf al-'unf) was launched by one of its leaders who called for a unilateral declaration to end the use of violence. 128 More than a year later, on 5 July 1997, the historical leadership itself issued a communiqué announcing the unilateral and unconditional initiative to end violence. 129 The initiative (mubadara) was supported by others, such as Salah Hashim, one of the students leaders of the 1970s, who issued his own communiqué. 130 But the initiative was not helped by the continuous low level warfare in Upper and Lower Egypt 131 and the trials in which members of the Jama'a were being sentenced to death.
132 Above all, the Luxor massacre of fifty-eight tourists on 17 November 1997 and the claim that it had been a Jama'a operation led by Ahmad Rifa'i Taha, 133 a member of the external leadership who is closely attached to bin Laden and who had earlier opposed the initiative, 134 would setback the initiative for years.
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Despite these setbacks the supporters of the initiative gradually gained the upper hand during 1998. Immediately after the Luxor attack the lawyer, Mun- In Minufiyya sixty members of a radical group were arrested after they threatened to burn a church (al-Hayat, 21 June 1997). On 15 November members of the Jama'a assaulted a police station in the town of Tama in the governorate of Sohaj, during which one member died. Four days earlier a fight in Nag' Hamadi cost the lives of a police officer, two policemen, and one member of the Jama'a (al-Hayat, 17 November 1997). 132 One of these, "the Bank trial", was famous for the amount of money the Jama'a had been able to rob from banks throughout Upper and Lower Egypt (al-Hayat, 5 November 1997). In another trial in the town of Tama two members of the Jama'a were sentenced to death (al-Hayat, 4 November 1997). 133 The external leadership issued several communiqués reproduced in al-Hayat, 19 and 20
November 1997. 134 See for extensive quotes from the letter al-Zayyat, al-Jama'at al-islamiyya, p. 300. tasar al-Zayyat, came out condemning it. 136 Usama al-Rushdi, another member of the external leadership living in the Netherlands, issued a communiqué entitled The Luxor Attack, a Dead End, and later attacked Ahmad Rifa'i Taha directly.
137 Others followed suit. In April Mustafa al-Muqri' , a member of the external leadership living in Britain, issued a report in which he supported the initiative. 138 The major change, however, occurred when 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman came out in support of the initiative on 22 October, in a statement issued from his prison in the United States. 139 He called for the movement to concentrate on spreading the call (da'wa) and a non-violent form of hisba.
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Finally, on 24 March 1999, on 'Id al-Adha (the Feast of Immolation), the external and internal leadership issued a joint communiqué in which they fully endorsed the initiative.
141 By then, the International Front Against Zionism under the leadership of bin Laden, supported by a former Egyptian leader of the Jama'a, had issued its fatwa in 1998 after it had declared war on the Americans in 1996.
Revisionism
After the issue of the common communiqué of the external and internal councils in 1999 it took another two years before the internal leadership took over completely and gained hegemony over both the external leadership and the members of the movement. 142 With help from the state they visited nine prisons in which their members were interned, beginning from October 2001 (one month after 9/11). In January 2002 they started to publish their famous series of four books, which would constitute what they called "revisionism" (muraja 'a historic leaders of the Jama'a al-Islamiyya. 143 Their content is not Salafi, but falls back on classic thinkers such as Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1111) and modern thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi. One is a general introduction to the series, 144 the other three treat in greater depth the topics that needed to be revised, such as takfir, 145 jihad, 146 and hisba. 147 These were followed by two other books: one on their condemnation of the Saudi attacks in 2003, 148 the other containing a general defence of revisionism. 149 In the summer of 2002 the weekly al-Musawwar published a series of interviews with the historical leadership. 150 In an impressive tour through the prisons the historical leadership propagated revisionism and demonstrated their power over their followers as well as the internal discipline within the movement. They still regarded themselves as Salafis, but organisationally they claimed to "resemble a party", willing to be accepted by the state as an NGO (jam'iyya).
The authors start out with an analysis of the present crisis for which Muslim youth (shabab muslim) is held responsible. They claim these had strayed from the right path, 152 and deviated from the middle of the road (wasatiyya), and that this led them to choose exaggeration in religion (ghuluw fi-l-din) and the transgression of boundaries (tajawuz al-hudud) and rules (ahkam). 153 The youth in their enthusiasm had confused means (wasila) with goals (ghaya), and had substituted derived principles (far') for primary principles (asl). 154 This confusion has in fact led to a situation that is even worse than the one before the confrontation with the state. Even if the Islamic youth acted in good faith and reacted to oppression and wanted to free prisoners, "they did not take into account an important truth, that through their actions injustice and oppression increased, the number of arrests grew in number, da'wa was forbidden, families were threatened, corruption (mafasid) became more widespread, while the common good (masalih) was further impaired, and the Jews could take advantage of this opportunity to sow dissension." 155 The result was a vicious circle of terror and counter-terror, leading to the spilling of blood and "murderous internal strife" (qital al-fitna). 156 The solution can only be found, they argue, by returning to the right path, correcting (tashih) [misguided] concepts (mafahim). 157 One must focus again on general principles (asl) and the common good (maslaha). The good (maslaha) must always be weighed against the bad (mafsada). 158 Following the classic scholar Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), the historic leadership holds the view that the common good is represented by protecting religion (din), the soul (nafs), reason ('aql) , offspring (nasl) and property (mal). 159 Everything that endangers these five principles runs contrary to the general good (maslaha). 160 In the same manner the correction of concepts pertains to giving priority to the principles (asl) instead of to the derivative matters ( far'). The goals of ta'bid al-nas li-rabbihim (submission of man to his master/creator) and guidance of mankind (hidayat al-khala'iq), or, in other words, the goal, the transition from sin (ma'siya) to obedience (ta'a), remains the same but the means to achieve this end are different. 161 They also believe that youth should recognise the authority of the 'ulama and should not themselves issue fatwas. 162 The reassertion of general principles, however, entails more than just a selfcritique and a revision of tactics. It also leads to a new epistemology and a fundamental redefinition of the Jama'a's members relation to reality. Whereas in the Charter the Jama'a argued that reality should be changed (taghyir) to adjust to religion, they now recognise a more complex relationship between reality and religion. "One of the obvious mistakes that has been made is to adopt opinions and create rules and issue fatwas that do not take reality (waqi') into account, and neglect to investigate the facts and do not take these as the primary sources for formulating fatwas." 163 In fact, the general good should take priority over the text (nass), "because the text must accomplish the general good and is not a goal in itself." 164 The general norm is that "Islam is a practical religion" (al-islam din 'amali) . 165 Even parts of the shari'a can be deferred if circumstances require it. 166 Moreover, for the first time they acknowledge that a knowledge of politics is crucial. "That is why a profound knowledge of the shari'a, as well as a knowledge of reality (al-'ilm bi-l-waqi ') , and a deep understanding of politics (al-fahm al-siyasi al-'amiq) are essential tools for tackling this subject." "Otherwise, " they argue, "people will destroy themselves, spill their own blood and that of others and lose their homeland without justification, and without serving the common good and attaining their goal." 167 The inclusion of reality is called the jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqi'). 168 For the first time, as well, history is valued as a practical, lived experience from which one must learn. 169 Such crucial concepts as hakimiyya, jahiliyya and taghut, derived from Sayyid Qutb, which had dominated the 1970s and the 1980s, are not directly condemned but are regarded as exaggerations that must be placed within a wider knowledge of fiqh and the way it works.
Adopting fatwas and opinions from a different time and applying them to completely different circumstances is recognised as one of the big mistakes the Jama'a committed. For example, the emergence of the concepts of takfir and kufr are explained as the result of torture in Nasser's prisons, but are rejected as innovations.
171 Muraja'at is therefore a critique of their former claim to Truth (ashab al-haqq). No longer is Islam portrayed as a programme (manhaj) that is "complete, total and final" and that can simply be implemented if the ruler implements the shari'a. Even the pious forefathers (al-salaf), the historical leadership argues, had stated that they did not hold a monopoly of the absolute truth. 172 Their writings should be analysed in historical context. 173 The historical leadership, in fact, acknowledges that life is complex and that the sources of Islam must be interpreted (ijtihad) and debated in order to adjust them according to constantly different places (makan), circumstances (ahwal) and times (zaman) in which Muslims live. 174 It is this recognition of (historical) time and (geographical, political and cultural) circumstances that allows them to change their ideas and accept flexibility. Rather than holding the truth, they regard themselves now as part of an ongoing debate about the truth. 175 In these continuing debates only the common good (maslaha) is eternal; the rest depends on circumstances. 176 In this new-found self-confidence Islam is regarded as a strong religion that takes from other religions and allows Muslims to "interact with life positively". 177 Borrowing what is beneficial from the West is no longer rejected. 178 What is condemned is loving the unbelievers and wishing them to be victorious over Muslims, a wholly different view from their previous writings, or those of contemporary Jihadi-Salafis such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his concept of al-wala' wa-l-bara '. 179 For the same reason they are now willing to accept the parliamentary system, although it might not be the ideal way to change society. 180 In their more lenient interpretation of Islam, the emphasis has moved to classical fiqh and the elaborate conditions and proofs that the traditional jurisprudence requires. Instead of the enthusiasm and moral outrage of the activist, legal procedures, and a totally different form of discipline, are upheld. One, for instance, should not pry into another's "secrets" (which is God's prerogative), to find out what he thinks. Instead one must seek to establish a society based on trust and accept at face value what people say and do (zahir). 181 Politically, this classical doctrine undermines their former justification for revolt, for as long as the ruler states he is a Muslim, "even if he does not apply the whole shari'a", rebellion against him is unjustified. 182 But even if the 'ulama condemn the ruler as an unbeliever, the disadvantages (mafasid) of a revolt must be weighed against the advantages (masalih) of accepting his rule. 183 On the basis of classic fiqh, also the robbing of Copts is condemned as well as attacks on tourists, who are protected by the visas which are regarded as aman (assurance of protection).
What does revisionism entail for jihad and hisba? In the new programme the Jama'a leadership does not renounce jihad in principle, but its status and function is subordinated to the larger concerns of the general good (tahqiq maslaha), making Islam victorious (nusrat al-din), and the ending of civil strife/dissension (izalat al-fitna). 184 Jihad is only allowed if it is a means (wasila) towards achieving the general welfare, not a goal in itself. 185 It must lead to the common goal of submission of men to God (ta'bid al-nas li-llah) and not to the fragmentation (taftit) and weakening (id'af) of the ummah. 186 Moreover, in accordance with the classical theory, it must only be directed against a foreign invasion. 187 In fact, the historical leadership argue, true Islam is not so much threatened by its enemies, but by Muslims who do not understand its rules, as is apparent from the suicide attacks in Riyadh in May 2003. 188 In their view, violence in Saudi Arabia and Palestine 189 strengthens the enemies of Islam and harms its reputation, 190 as well as the interests of Muslims.
Like the book on jihad, the one on hisba is primarily meant to curb its excesses. 192 The problem with the previous period is that hisba, like jihad, became a goal in itself and was not regarded "as a means to realise the general welfare of society". 193 Hisba is regarded as a legal and religious duty (farida, fard dini), like fasting, praying and other duties, but is a fard kifaya, a collective obligation not imposed on every individual Muslim. It is sufficient that some Muslims fulfil this obligation, for instance the representives of the government. 194 Yet hisba is still regarded as the main instrument against the "internal enemy of the principles of the revelation" 195 as well as the most important instrument of maintaining morality. 196 The new interpretation of hisba by the historical leadership of the Jama'a, as laid down already in the classical fiqh, is based on virtue and moderateness. 197 It has become an expression of social responsibility of the "normal individual" (al-fard al-'adi), who shares this task with a special functionary, the muhtasib, who is a govermental officer and not a self-appointed activist. 198 Their cooperation for the common good is an expression of the new relationship between the citizen and the state. For instance, if a citizen sees a deviation, he should not punish the culprit by force on his own volition, but rather should hand the person over to the authorities "in order that they fulfil their legal duties." 199 In fact, in its new form, hisba has become the cornerstone of a new Muslim civil society that is based on the obligations and rights of the citizen in a new contractual relationship with the state. Hisba is regarded as a social obligation (ijabiyya) of the citizen on whose diligence the state's prosperity and well-being depends. For in the view of the historical leadership, "the more the population positively works together with social institutions and understands its role and is encouraged to exert itwithin the confines of the law-the more society enjoys rest and stability." 200 tion (fasad)". 201 The precondition of the new renaissance of society is that hisba is exerted with respect for the sanctity (hurma) of other citizens and their rights. 202 
Conclusion
The history of the past three decades of the Jama'a al-Islamiyya can be read as an experiment in Islamist activism with a strong Salafi bent in Egypt. The Jama'a has twice gone through all the phases of the cycle of contestation. During the first cycle it started out as an apolitical, pious group of students that became politicised and activist during the second half of the 1970s and succumbed to violence with the assassination of Sadat. During the second cycle it learned little from its previous experience. When the second generation was released in 1984, the Jama'a started out with a strident and activist stance and with a provocative level of violence, ending in a second round of contestation with the state in the 1990s in which an unprecedented number of people were killed. Although the state was to blame for much of the violence and the escalation, it is clear that the Salafi repertoire of contestation of "forbidding wrong by force" was highly provocative, delegitimised the state, sometimes even calling for its overthrow, and replacing it with a utopian rule in the form of a caliphate. But the problems ran deeper and were not limited to its tactics as a social movement. As is clear from the theoretical works of the Jama'a in the 1980s and after the period of revisionism, its relationship with reality (waqi') is crucial to understanding the ideological developments. The major transition is one from a strong Salafi tendency, which completely depended on religious sources and advocated a change of reality (taghyir al-waqi') to fit the text, to a phase in which the Jama'a were forced to give reality and the general good (maslaha) more room, culminating in the development of a "jurisprudence of reality" (fiqh al-waqi ') . Although the historical leadership might not be as pragmatic as to denounce jihad and hisba completely, by means of a relativistic, historical, and circumstantial interpretation of the sources of Islam, they have provided the groundwork for a much more mature Islamic political theory that focuses on human agency and opens the way for an Islamic civil society based on an Islamic concept of civility and civic virtue that has left behind the rigorism and dogmatism of Salafism.
